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We use two rounds of surveys, in 2000 and 2008, in the Zhili Township children’s 
garment cluster in Zhejiang Province to examine in depth its evolution. Firm size has 
grown on average in terms of output and employment, and increasing divergence in firm 
sizes has been associated with a significant increase in specialization and outsourcing 
among firms in the cluster.  Although initial investments have more than tripled, they 
remain low enough so that formal bank loans remain an insignificant source of finance. 
Accompanying lower entry barriers, there have been an increasing number of firms in the 
cluster, which have driven down profit and bid up wages, particularly since the year 
2000. Facing severe competition, more firms have begun to upgrade their product quality. 
By the year 2007, nearly half of the sampled had established registered trademarks and 
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1. Introduction 
China’s rapid rural industrialization seems to defy the conventional wisdom that 
high transactions costs imply vertical integration. Its rapid industrialization has been 
accompanied by the emergence of numerous “specialty cities” of a particular kind. 
Thousands of firms, large and small, many specialized in a finely defined production 
step, are agglomerated in a densely populated region, where some particular 
manufactured consumer good is churned out in millions (if not billions) annually. Many 
formerly rural towns in the coastal areas have become so specialized, boasting 
themselves as the world’s Socks City, Sweater City, Kid’s Clothing City, Footwear 
Capital, and so on. While these rapidly growing rural industries have been a major engine 
of China’s unprecedented economic growth in the last two decades, their role in the 
development and growth process can be easily oversimplified.  Moreover there are 
warning signs that these industries’ role as a source of growth is reaching its limits.  
Competitive pressures at the global level, product market level, and on the labour market 
side are limiting output prices.  At the same time, as China’s growing prosperity is 
reflected in real wage increases, manufacturing costs are rising because productivity rises 
do not keep pace with rising labour costs.  Despite numerous popular media reports on 
these phenomena (for example Deering, 2008; Lee, 2008), few studies have rigorously 
investigated the mechanisms behind the emergence and evolution of these clusters.   
The cluster-based rural industrialization described above not only plays a 
significant role in China’s industrial growth but has also been important in the early 
stages of industrialization in other East Asian countries and many European countries 
(Hayami, 1998; World Bank, 2008). Many clusters are initially formed as agglomerations 
of small and mediums-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Schmitz 1995; Schmitz and Nadvi, 
1999). Because most SMEs are generally labour intensive, the cluster-based rural 
industrialization model is conducive to generating nonfarm employment and fits well the 
comparative advantage of many developing countries, which are often marked with low 
capital-labour ratios and high population density (Hayami, 1998). Therefore, it is 
important to study the mechanism of cluster formation in developing countries.  4 
 
Most studies on the formation and evolution of clusters in developing countries 
are based on retrospective surveys and very few have tracked firm performance over a 
long period of time (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006). In this paper, we make use of two rounds 
of surveys, in 2000 and 2008, in the Zhili Township children’s garment cluster in 
Zhejiang Province to examine the evolution of market structure and productivity in 
depth.
ii Three decades ago, most people in this rural town were paddy farmers. Nowadays 
Zhili township embodies one of the largest children garment production centers in China 
and the world. In the year 2006, a trade report stated that there were over 5000 children’s 
garment manufacturers in Zhili Township (Wu, Yue, and Sim, 2007).  In this cluster, the 
production of garments has been divided into very fine phases. Many of the production 
tasks are undertaken by family workshops. Recently, because of high labour and land 
costs, some enterprises have begun to subcontract production to firms in neighboring 
Anhui Province. An in-depth case study on the evolution of this rural industrial cluster 
can help shed light on an important source of China’s rapid industrialization and 
productivity growth over the past several decades as well as on its limitations.  
We find that in the initial stage of cluster formation, because of lower capital and 
technology barriers to entry, competition in the product market was severe and formal 
education was not an important characteristic of owners/managers. China’s initial 
industrialization path since economic reform in the late 1970s has been labour-intensive 
(Lin, Cai, and Li, 2003).  Recently, shortage of skilled labourers has become an 
increasingly frequent issue. In the later years covered in our surveys, we observe a drop 
in profit, which is driven not only by competition in the product market but also by rising 
labour costs. This pressure has induced firms to invest more in design, branding, ISO 
certification, and quality control so as to climb the value chain. An offsetting cost trend 
has been a tendency toward production specialization and outsourcing.  We also find that 
TFP growth has been rather stagnant in the cluster over the past two decades.  This 
suggests that reallocation of labour from the low-productivity agricultural sector to the 
more productive industrial sector has been a key driving force behind China’s rapid 
industrialization, rather than TFP growth within labour-intensive sectors.  
In the next section we describe basic features of the Zhili children’s garment 
cluster; in section 3 we outline major aspects of the evolution of the Zhili cluster since 5 
 
1990; section 4 draws conclusions and implications for China’s economic growth and 
development. 
 
2. A Brief History of Zhili Cluster 
Zhili Township is located in northern Zhejiang Province, close to Taihu Lake, 
between Hangzhou and Shanghai. Historically, Zhili was an important silk and weaving 
production center. The name of Zhili stands for “weaving town” in Chinese. Population 
density has been very high in Zhili for hundreds of years. In the planned economic era, 
because of rather limited land, agricultural income was far from sufficient. As a result, 
many farmers produced pillow covers and bedding at home to generate side income, even 
though this activity was illegal at the time and was called the “tail of capitalism”. 
Although the local government tried in many ways to oppress these private industrial 
activities, Zhili’s reputation as a bedding production center spread widely. After the 
central government adopted reform policies in the late 1970s, the local government 
reversed its opposition to private entrepreneurial activities. In the early 1980s, the local 
township government set up a bedding-product marketplace.  
By the mid-1980s, the market for bedding products became saturated. Some Zhili 
merchants who were specialized in selling bedding products all over China conveyed 
back the market information that children’s garments were in short supply. This 
information stimulated a few farmers to start producing children’s clothes at home. Some 
family members were responsible for making clothes while others carried the clothes to 
various cities to sell them. Neighbors observed the success of the beginners and began to 
imitate them by producing children’s garments in their homes, and by the late 1980s, 
more than ten villages in Zhili Township were specialized in children’s garment 
production. The growing market facilitated the emergence of specialized merchants who 
purchased children’s clothes produced in Zhili and sold them in rented counters in 
department stores all over China. Meanwhile, several wholesale marketplaces of 
children’s garment were set up in the Zhili town center.
iii  
Since the 1990s, specialization has spread to the production process itself.  Many 
farmers moved their production to the Zhili town center. They either bought or rented a 
three-story house combining the function of living, dining and working. The first floor 6 
 
usually was a store and sometimes for production as well, while production was often 
concentrated in the second floor. Workers slept in the third floor. Although the rent was 
much higher in the Zhili town center than in nearby villages, these costs were more than 
offset by agglomeration benefits, including those arising from better market information 
and reduced marketing costs and access to a centralized labour market. Another benefit 
arising from centralization of production arose from a signal of quality and reliability.  
Having a storefront house sent a strong signal of credibility and quality to merchants who 
came from outside the local market area.  By 1999, there were already about 1800 such 
“three-in-one” workshops. These stores mainly sold their own products, which were 
regarded being higher quality than those produced in dispersed farmers’ houses in nearby 
villages.  
The success of Zhili’s business model attracted more merchants to order 
children’s garments in either the wholesale markets or storefronts of the workshops.  In 
1999, the wholesale markets sold 75 million units with sales of 1.4 billion yuan. In 2000, 
to meet the rapidly increasing demand, the township government built the eighth 
wholesale marketplace. The products from nearby villages, which were generally of 
lower quality than those produced in the storefronts, were primarily sold in these 
wholesale markets. Fierce competition led to lower prices and profit margins in the 
wholesale markets, and many producers responded by relocating to the town center.  Of 
course, the increasing demand for the preferred locations drove up housing prices, which 
approximately doubled between 1995 and 2000. Thus entry-level capital requirements 
were rising apace.  
In addition to the rapid development of wholesale markets, related businesses, 
such as button and zipper production workshops, computer design studios, machinery 
sales and repairing stores, packaging and logistical services, also emerged. The town 
center was expanded from a narrow, 0.5 kilometer street to an area of four square 
kilometers, including two three-star hotels, over three dozen small hotels, and hundreds 
of restaurants. By 2005, Zhili had over 6000 enterprises engaged in children’s garment 
production, employing over 200,000 workers and accounting for one-third of the national 
market.  7 
 
However, since 2005, the cluster has faced many new challenges. Employers 
report that there is a labour “shortage,” with skilled workers in increasingly short supply. 
Moreover, on September 14 and October 19 in 2006, two fatal fire accidents resulted in 
the deaths of 14 an 8 people, respectively. These disasters received wide media attention 
and promoted local governments to take various safety measures, in particular, all the 
three-in-one workshops, where workers live, dine and work in the same place, must 
install fire exits, and there are other tougher safety standards.
 iv These new standards 
obviously have raised costs to many workshops which were already struggling with rising 
labour costs. Local enterprises have adapted in different ways. Some have installed more 
capital-intensive production lines, reducing labour requirements and at the same time 
upgrading production quality.  Other enterprises have been outsourcing production to 
lower wage regions in neighboring Anhui Province.  
The local government also helped firms to adjust to the changing environment and 
to improve their ability to compete in domestic and international markets.  Perhaps most 
important, a new quality inspection center was established to randomly check the quality 
of local products. Second, preferential treatments were given to firms that established 
respected brand names, including access to land at reduced prices.  
 
3.  Basic Features of the Industry 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the Zhili cluster and for firms in the textile and 
garment industry in China, Zhejiang Province, Huzhou City in Zhejiang taken from the 
2004 China Economic Census.
 v In comparing our sample with the 2004 China Economic 
Census it is important to note that the 2004 Census disproportionately covers larger 
enterprises than those we surveyed in Zhili. Thus, we believe that our survey is 
complementary to the economic census in that it provides a better coverage of the range 
of firms at the dynamic small-to-medium size range than does the China Economic 
Census.  For example, in Huzhou city (a prefecture city that contains Zhili), the Census 
covers only 1492 firms in the textile and garment sector, and their median output in 2004 
was 2,466,000 yuan.  In Zhili township alone, there are at least 5,000 workshops engaged 
in children garment production with median output of 845,000 yuan in the year 2005 
(http://www1.hz66.com/zhili/in2‐1.asp), only one-third the reported median output of the 8 
 
Huzhou enterprises (all monetary values are expressed in real terms, in 1990 values). 
When firm size is measured in terms of value added or number of workers, the difference 
between the Zhili firms and those in Huzhou city is not as stark.  The ratio of median 
value added of the Zhili firms to those in Huzhou is 82 per cent, and the comparable ratio 
for employment is 67 per cent. 
The median share of wages in value added is nearly the same in the Zhili, 
regional, and national samples. The data on capital stock in the Zhili sample includes 
only equipment and not real estate or plant structures.  Therefore, a comparison of the 
capital:output ratios of the Zhili firms with the regional and national samples is not 
meaningful.   
 One of the most striking statistics in both surveys is the rapid turnover of firms.  
Of the 121 firms sampled in 1999, only 31, approximately 25 per cent, existed in 1990.  
Of the 135 firms sampled in 2008, only 35, again approximately 25 per cent existed in 
2000.  Mean output value of the surviving firms increased significantly.  By the year 
2007, the average firm produced about 75  per cent more than those in the sample in 
2000.  In the 1990s, this pattern is also evident, although less pronounced, with mean 
output increasing about 46  per cent over the sample period. 
The data indicate that these are small enterprises, but they also exhibit large 
variation in size and performance.  The median number of employees was as few as 8 in 
1990 and is only 26 in the last year of the 2000 sample.  In the last year covered in the 
2000 survey, the ratio of the mean number of employees in the top quartile of firms to the 
mean in the lowest quartile was 4.0; in the last year covered in the 2008 survey, the 
comparable ratio is nearly 11.  The dispersion of output value is even larger, equal to 
nearly 30 in the last year of the 2000 survey and nearly 33 in 2007, the last full year 
covered in the 2008 survey. 
A major feature of these clustered enterprises is low entry barriers in terms of 
initial investment.  As reported in Table 2, firms starting up in the 1980s report median 
initial investment of approximately 7,700 yuan in the 2000 survey and 36,200 yuan in the 
2008 survey (in real terms with 1990 as the base year).  Firms reported in 2000 survey 
starting in the 1990s reported a median startup investment of 16,000 yuan, or a typical 
worker’s wage income of one and half years, while those in the 2008 survey reported 9 
 
75,000 yuan. Among the firms in the 2000 survey, virtually all initial financing was from 
the initial principal or his family.  Among the firms surveyed in 2008, the proportion of 
initial investments obtained from formal bank loans has been small.  However, the mean 
proportion of initial investment obtained by means of formal bank loans grew from 
negligible amount for firms that started operations prior to 1990 almost 13 per cent in 
2007. The findings are consistent with early studies (Huang, Zhang and Zhu, 2008; Ruan 
and Zhang, 2009) on two other rural industrial clusters in Zhejiang Province, namely  that 
lower entry barriers due to clustering enable more firms to participate in the nonfarm 
production process.    
Table 3 and figures 1, 2 and 9 summarize features of wages and profits.  Firms in 
both samples show a sharply increase trend of the proportion of wages in value added in 
both surveys, but the causes are quite different. Profit as a share of valued added declined 
by roughly half among firms in the 2000 sample and by about 15 per cent in the 2008 
sample. Monthly wages in our sample of firms grew less rapidly than the provincial mean 
for workers in collectively owned firms in Zhejiang between 1990 and 2000, but the 
growth rates of the two series exhibit substantial convergence in the over the period 
1999-2007.  In the 2000 sample, wages were roughly steady while product-market 
competition evidently forced output prices to decline nearly 60 percent in real terms.  The 
trends in the period covered by the 2008 survey are in sharp contrast, with output prices 
roughly constant (declining by about four per cent in real terms) and mean wages 
increasing by nearly 40 percent.  The pressure on profits had important implications for 
the evolution of production methods and product quality, as we discuss below.   
 
4.  Evolution of the Industry 
We discuss several measures of changes in industry structure and the complexity 
of manufacturing.   
Specialization in production and outsourcing. 
There is no information on outsourcing in the 2000 survey.  Figure 3 shows the 
proportion of firms outsourcing in the 2008 survey, and the trend is sharply upward.  
Between 2000 and 2006, the proportion of firms in the full sample who report 
outsourcing some production rises from about 2.5 percent to about 12.5 per cent, and the 10 
 
proportion of firms outsourcing among the 16 firms entering the sample in 2007 is about 
18 per cent.  We notice that the ratio of mean output value of firms in the top quartile of 
mean production to those in the bottom quartile increased from approximately 24 to 30 
between 2006 and 2007.   
Branding and quality 
As discussed above, one of the most important issues facing this industry has been 
increasing competition creating increased pressure on profits and a tendency for firms to 
cut costs resulting in a self-defeating “race to the bottom” in terms of product quality and 
with negative implications for product and employee safety.  In the 2008 sample, 
inflation-corrected profits were only 19 per cent higher in 2008 than in 2000 despite a 
near tripling of real output.  Real profits were actually lower in 2008 than in 2005.  As 
discussed in section 2, industry leaders understand the negative implications of this trend 
for quality standards and have promoted quality certification and development of brand 
names in order to create credible indicators of product quality and integrity.  Branding 
and quality certification require investments of entrepreneurs’ time and financial costs. 
They are a signal to the market that firm stands to lose its investment if its products fall 
short of promised quality. Moreover, they provide a barrier to effective competition from 
firms cutting costs but lowering quality. Figures 4 through 7 show the proportion of firms 
in the 2008 sample that have obtained and that have applied for trademarks and 
certification from the International Office of Standardization (ISO).  The proportion of 
firms in the survey with trademarks grew from 10 per cent in 2000 to about 38 per cent in 
2005 and to 40 per cent by 2007. There were no firms with ISO certification in 2000, 
although 10 per cent of firms had applied.  Nearly 45 per cent of firms had achieved ISO 
certified status by 2006.  It is noteworthy that among firms appearing in the sample in 
2007, less than 10 per cent had registered trademarks and a similar number had applied; a 
similar gap appears for firms with and applying for ISO certification.  We take this as 
further evidence of increasing specialization in production, with firms that exist mainly as 
suppliers of semifinished products to firms farther down the production chain not 
depending on trademarks or ISO certification to establish their bona fides to their 
customers.     11 
 
Figure 8 shows mean investment in design over the sample period.  The average 
investment (including firms that reported spending nothing on product design) jumped 
about 64 percent in real terms between 2000 and 2005 and another 11 percent between 
2005 and 2007. 
Does Quality Pay?  Evidence from Price Data.  Industry efforts to avoid a “race 
to the bottom” in terms of product quality would fail if consumers were not willing to pay 
for the cost of producing better-quality merchandise.  Measures of consumers’ demand 
for quality can be obtained from estimates of hedonic price indexes for product 
characteristics.  We specify hedonic indexes as follows: 
  ln it j it it
j
UP A X β ε = ⋅+ ∑  (1) 
where UP is the reported unit price of output for firm i at time t, where the Xi are various 
characteristics of the items produced by the firms in our sample.  These characteristics 
include the following: 
•  Expenditure on raw material per unit of output; 
•  Total annual expenditure on product design by the firm; 
•  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has received ISO certification or has a 
registered a trademark; 
•  Two variables representing the proportion of a firm’s output declared to be “high 
quality” or of “medium quality” garments, respectively. These “quality” 
measures should be interpreted to reflect the type of market the respective items 
are intended to be sold. (“Low quality” is the omitted quality category.) 
•  A variable representing the proportion of the firm’s output produced for the 
“toddlers” market (versus “teens). 
We take the estimated parameters β as equilibrium outcomes of firms’ costs, their desire 
to place themselves in particular markets, and consumer preferences. 
  Estimation results for the hedonic index equations (1) and (2) are reported in table 
5.  The simplest formulation is shown in column (1).  The estimated coefficients of raw 
materials, design expenditure, and the ISO or trademark dummy are all positive and 
significant. The coefficients imply that a one-yuan increase in raw material content of a 
garment is associated, cet. par. With a two percent increase in price per unit; that a 10,000 12 
 
increase in total design expenditure per year is associated with a one-percent increase in price; 
and the presence of ISO certification or a trademark is associated with a 27 percent higher 
product price.  
In column (2) of table 5, we see that when a dummy variable = 1 for data in a 
reporting year after 2000 is included in the hedonic regression, along with its interaction 
with the raw material variable, we observe the interesting result that the relative hedonic 
weight of raw material/unit is much higher in the year 2000 than in later years. This 
decline in the relative weight of raw materials is consistent with rising emphasis on 
product quality by producers and rising demand for quality by consumers over time. 
Columns (3) and (4) report results for hedonic equations that include additional 
characteristic variables.  Not surprisingly, high- and medium-quality production are both 
associated with significantly higher per unit prices and low-quality production, and 
“toddlers” garments are priced lower than “teens” garments, holding constant other 
product characteristics.  When the design variable is interacted with the quality variables, 
the estimated coefficient of the design variable is much larger than in the regression that 
does not include these interaction terms, while the two interaction terms are both 
negative.  While a negative interaction between declared quality and design expenditure 
may at first appear to be counterintuitive, we interpret this result to imply that “low 
quality” garments produced by firms that invest in product design are not perceived as 
undesirable by consumers. 
  
Performance 
We discuss two measures of firm performance: (i) profit per unit of invested 
capital, and (ii) production function parameters. Production functions are estimated only 
with data from the 2008 survey, because although the 2008 and 2000 surveys were 
designed to collect the same information, there are items in the 2008 that are not included 
in the 2000 survey, such as amount spent on design.   
We specify both a value-added production function and a total-output production 
function in Cobb-Douglas form as follows.  
  it it it it YA L K
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where Y and Q are value added and total output, respectively, for firm i in year t; L and K  
are measures of labour and capital, respectively; the Xn are intermediate inputs including 
raw materials, semi-manufactured garments, design costs, and so on; and ε and u are iid 
error terms.  The evidence from our estimates of hedonic price indexes suggest that 
design and other expenditures on product characteristics are inputs that should be treated 
parallel to raw material and intermediate inputs in the production process. In one 
specification of the production function we also include a dummy variable for the year of 
observation to capture total factor productivity (TFP) changes over time.  
Profit per Unit of Invested Capital  Figures 9a and 9b show the trend of median 
profit as a proportion of invested capital in the 2008 sample. In figure 9a, profit is 
calculated as reported sales valued in current prices minus all reported costs, adjusted for 
the implicit wage of the entrepreneur, and deflated by the GDP deflator for Zhejiang 
using 1990 as the base year; invested capital is deflated as described in the discussion of 
table 2.  The profit ratios are indexed to the year 2000 = 100
vi.  In figure 9a, 
profit/invested capital for all firms falls between 2000 and 2005, rises in 2006, and falls 
by a rather large amount in 2007.  On the other hand, the profit ratio for the “survivor” 
firms that existed in 2000 is somewhat higher in 2007 than in 2000.  The ratio for new 
entrants is a little lower (in 2007) than for all firms taken together.  When profit is not 
adjusted for the implicit salary of the entrepreneur, the profit ratio is lower in 2007 than 
in 2000 in all cases.  However, the firms that continuously operated from at least 2000 
experienced a smaller relative decline than did the sample as a whole.  We note three 
possible causes of the relatively low profit ratio for the larger sample of firms in 2007 and 
for new entrants than for those in continuous operation: (i) we have better estimates of 
investment for younger firms because of the shorter period of time covered by the data; 
(ii) rising wages have cut into the profit rate of new firms more severely than into the 
profit rate for older firms, perhaps due to sluggish wage adjustments for employed 
workers; (iii) as noted in the introduction, in recent years, safety requirements have raised 
costs, and these requirements for safe workplaces may impinge more severely on new 
firms. 14 
 
Production function. Production function estimates are reported in table 6.  
Estimation results for the value-added specification are reported in columns (1) through 
(3) and those for the total-output specifications in column (4) through (6).  The simplest 
specifications are reported in columns (1) and (4). In both specifications, the estimated 
output elasticities sum to approximately unity, indicating approximate constant returns to 
scale.  The estimated labour elasticities are about four times the magnitude of the 
estimated capital elasticities.   
In the estimates reported in columns (2) and (5), the capital variable is defined net 
of design expenditure and design expenditure is included as a separate input in addition to 
a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has achieved certification for meeting the 
standards of the International Safety Office (ISO). The estimated coefficients of the 
additional variables are all positive and statistically significant, and the estimated 
elasticity of “net” physical capital falls by about one-half.  The estimated elasticity of 
labour is somewhat lower also. The presence of ISO certification raises value added by 
about 25 per cent and the value of output by about 16 per cent.  
The estimates reported in columns (3) and (6) include a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the reporting year is not 2000, the year in which there are the smallest number of 
firms, all of which have survived long enough to be surveyed in 2008.  The estimated 
coefficient of the “after 2000” variable thus captures two opposing forces: (i) surviving 
firms are expected to be more productive than the average firm; (ii) competitive factors 
and learning should raise productivity over time. The “after 2000” dummy is also 
interacted with the other inputs in order to capture the impact of trends suggested in the 
hedonic-index estimation, that the marginal value of intermediate inputs relative to other 
product characteristics as declined over time.  The estimated coefficients of the “after 
2000” dummy and its interactions all have the expected signs, but they are statistically 
insignificant in the value-added specification. In the total-output production function 
results reported in column (6), the “after 2000” coefficient indicates that TFP increased 
significantly after 2000 and that the estimated elasticity of intermediate inputs fell 
relative to those of other inputs, consistent with the hedonic price index results.  The 
estimated coefficient of the “after 2000” dummy with labour indicates that the output 
elasticity of labour is higher in the years after 2000.
vii  15 
 
Overall, TFP in the cluster appears to have grown at a respectable rate over the 
period following 2000.  This TFP growth understates the contribution of the cluster to 
regional TFP growth, because a major source of China’s outstanding economic growth in 
the reform era has been movement out of agriculture and from traditional to more 
technologically advanced industries (Zhang and Tan, 2007). Because the labour 
productivity in the non-farm sector is higher than the agricultural sector, even if TFP in 
the non-farm sector maintains constant, a simple reallocation of labour from the 
agricultural sector will lead to overall economic growth.
viii 
The production function estimation results are consistent those of the hedonic 
price index and support the hypothesis that  output value is determined by  characteristics 
associated with design and other measures of quality in addition to “pure” raw material. 
Attempts to corroborate the production-function estimation results using firm fixed-effect 
regression yield very imprecise estimation results.   
 
5. Summary 
Our overview of the evolution of firms in the Zhili children’s garment cluster 
highlights critical features of one of the most important drivers of China’s spectacular 
growth during the reform period as well as some significant limitations.  The average 
firm in Zhili in 2007, the last year included in the 2008 sample, is 75  per cent larger in 
terms of output than the average firm in 2000 and more than 7 times larger than in 1990, 
the first observation year of the 2000 survey.  At the same time, the dispersion of output 
and employment among firms has grown immensely.  One indicator of rising dispersion 
of firm size can be seen by comparing median employment, which grew from 20 workers 
per firm in 2000, first year of the 2008 survey, to 26, an increase of 30 percent, while the 
ratio of mean employment of the top quartile of employers to the bottom quartile grew to 
nearly 11 from 7. The far greater increase in output dispersion than employment 
dispersion implies a substantial growth in the dispersion of average labour productivity.  
The divergence in firm size is associated with a significant increase in specialization 
among firms, indicated by the proportion of firms that outsource some of their 
production, which grew from about 2 percent of all firms in 2000 to approximately 20 
percent of all firms in 2007. 16 
 
Although startup costs have risen significantly with median initial investment 
among firms founded after the year 2000 about twice as large in real terms as among 
those founded before 1990, many entrepreneurs can still afford to enter the business using 
their own savings. The cluster-based production structure provides a good opportunity for 
many ordinary farmers with limited capital to become entrepreneurs.  Moreover, rising 
incomes have provided more resources for business investment. Formal bank financing 
still accounts for only a small fraction of initial investment.  The rather low initial 
investment threshold has facilitated business entries and therefore intensified competition 
in both the product market and in the labour market. Not surprisingly, profit margins 
declined as prices fell (during the years covered by the first survey) and wage costs shot 
up (during years covered by the second survey).  
Avoiding a race to the bottom in terms of declining profit margins and declining 
quality (Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006) while maintaining employee safety is a major 
structural problem facing this highly fragmented industry.  The township government has 
imposed safety regulations in response to some major industrial accidents, and the firms 
themselves have taken steps to signal their commitment to product quality by investing in 
trademarks and ISO certification.  Moreover, our estimates of hedonic price indexes and 
production functions support the hypothesis that consumers are willing to pay for 
additional product quality.  By the year 2007, nearly half of the firms in Zhili had 
established registered trademarks and nearly 20 percent had become ISO certified.  Firms 
whose main function is to serve as subcontractors for enterprises producing finished 
products for the wholesale and retail markets are monitored by their outsourcing partners, 
and the payoff to establishing a trademark is reduced.  This characteristic may account 
for the very low proportion of registered trademarks and absence of trademark 
applications among firms entering the data in 2007. 
We have used two measures of firm performance: profit per unit of invested 
capital, and total factor productivity.  The ratio of profit to invested capital is 
substantially lower in 2007 than in 2000, at least for firms that have not been in 
continuous operation since at least 2000. However, TFP has tended to rise over time.  We 
conjecture that the low profit ratio is attributable to some combination of rising wage 17 
 
costs, a more accurate measure of total investment, and to the stricter imposition of safety 
regulations.  
Clustering within established communities where long-time relationships among 
family and neighbors prevail offers an institutional substitute for court enforcement of 
contractual relationships among borrowers and lenders and between outsourcing firms 
and their subcontractors.  Local government has served a facilitating role in the 
innovation of institutional arrangements to prevent a destructive “race to the bottom” in 
terms of product quality and employee safety.  The employment opportunities provided 
to workers with negligible productive opportunities in farming in Zhili and nearby 
locations have been a major contributor to rising aggregate TFP growth.  However, rising 
wage costs imply that the supply of labour is not as highly elastic as in the past. The 
cluster’s future growth will depend on higher rates of investment in both tangible and 
intangible capital (design costs, trademarking, copyrighting, etc.)  Small investors will be 
increasingly consigned to operate as subcontractors for producers of brand-name 
clothing, and formal contract enforcement may become an issue. These changes likely 
require not only an upgrade of contractual formalities but also of courts’ ability and 
willingness to enforce loan contracts and other contractual arrangements fairly and 
transparently.  Hopefully, local and regional governments will respond to this need 
positively as they have to the need for quality and reputational certification.  Such 
responses to existing institutional inadequacies can provide a critical stepping stone on 
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Table 1  Summary Statistics  
  Aggregation Level and 










No. of Workers 
Annual Wage 
1,000 yuan 
Mean China  2004  118,841  6,832  1,242.92  109.71  0.71  99.88  5.15 
 Zhejiang  2004  24,563  7,221  1,320.40  140.69  0.67  79.74  5.80 
 Huzhou  2004  1,492  7,833  1,216.71  146.36  0.58  68.38  6.11 
Median  China  2004  118,841 1,648  280.44 54.55 0.59  35.00  4.58 
  Zhejiang  2004  24,563 1,857  295.28 71.93 0.57  30.00  5.29 
  Huzhou  2004 1,492 2,466  335.11 85.53 0.52  30.00  5.55 
  2008 Zhili Survey             
Mean  2000  60  904  378.02 1.92  0.53  28.2 7.42 
  2005  116  2,508  718.91 3.24  0.51  45.5 9.15 
  2006  123  2,703  758.52 4.28  0.53  50.0 9.62 
  2007  135 3,015  884.20  5.31 0.55  50.8 11.08 
Median  2000  60  599  217.91 2.00  0.49  20 7.20 
  2005 116 845  275.58  1.78  0.54  20  8.95 
  2006 123 967  340.96  2.02  0.55  26  9.87 
  2007 135 929  291.55  2.37  0.56  26  11.16 
  2000 Zhili Survey             
Mean 1990  34  390 119.29 7.34 0.39 9.1  5.23
  1995  81  413 118.04 8.03 0.40 11.2  4.60
  1997  100  513 134.13 11.94 0.48 13.2  5.00
  1999  120  565 118.34 16.86 0.56 16.0  5.19
Median 1990  34  300 81.40 6.30 0.28 8.0  4.80
  1995  81  292 72.00 7.21 0.37 10.0  4.39
  1997  100  348 81.80 11.10 0.50 12.0  4.88
  1999  120  401 74.78 15.76 0.57 13.0  5.11
Note: China, Zhejiang, and Huzhou data calculated by authors from the China Economic Census in 2004.  They include data for 




Table 2 Initial Investment 
Year Founded 
Number 
of Firms Initial Investment
(10,000)
Proportion of
 Initial Investment 
from a Bank(%)
2008 Survey    Mean Median  
1982-1990 8 4.07 3.62 0.00
1991-1995 10 14.79 3.40 3.3
1996-2000 41 5.94 4.01 1.7
2001-2007 75 25.06 7.50 4.1
2000 Survey 
1980-1990  35 1.11 0.77 No funding from formal 
lenders or government  1991-1995 47 1.33 1.02
1996-1999 39 2.45 1.60
Note:   Initial investment deflated by price index for investment in fixed capital, Zhejiang 
1990 = 1.00.  See Fleisher, Li, Zhao (2008).   Deflator values are 1982-90, .689; 1991-95, 




Table 3 Wages and Prices 
 Wages/Value  Added  Monthly  Wage (Yuan)  Output Price 
  Men  Women  Last Year of 




2000 0.49 72.2 72.7  104
2005 0.54 90.8 90.7  104
2006 0.55 93.1 92.2  101




1990   0.28 100.8  172
1995 0.38 88.6  113
1997 0.53 96.4  107
1999 0.62 100.0  100
Notes: 
 a. Base years for wages and prices are 1990.   
b. Wage index is based on mean wage over sampled firms.  
c. Output price in 2008 survey is mean reported per-unit price of output sold. 
d. Index is calculated for each firm and then averaged over all firms. 






Table 4 Ratio of Marketing and Design Costs in Total Cost 
  Median Ratio of Marketing and 
Design Costs  




2007  .010 
Entered Data 2007  .020 
2000 Survey   All Firms 








Table 5 Hedonic Price Indices 






(43.39 (8.36) (8.17) (7.16) 





(2.42) (5.44) (6.16) (4.78) 





(2.55) (2.60) (2.02) (2.51) 





(7.38) (7.47) (4.74) (4.03) 
High Quality     0.66
** 0.63
** 
   (4.86)  (3.72) 
Medium Quality     0.37
** 0.39
** 
   (4.45)  (3.54) 
Toddler     -0.20
* -0.15 
   (-2.46)  (-1.79) 




  (3.76) (4.39) (4.27) 




  (-4.59) (-5.07) (-4.84) 
High Quality*RM Cost      0.04
** 
    (1.94) 
Med Quality*RM Cost      0.02 
    (1.09) 
High Quality*Design Exp      -0.25
** 
    (-2.53) 
Med Quality*Design Exp      -0.24
* 
    (-2.46) 
R2  0.37 0.40 0.50 0.64 
n  287 287 286 286 
Notes: 
a.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of average unit price of output reported by the firm;  
b.   RM per unit is total expenditure on raw materials in yuan divided by the total number of units produced by the firm in a year.   
c.   Design Expenditure is firm’s total expenditure on design in a year in 10,000 yuan.   
d.   ISO Cert or Trademark is a dummy variable for whether or not a firm has received ISO certification or has registered a trademark;  
e.  High Quality is the proportion of firm’s product lines that are self-identified as being high quality. Medium Quality is the proportion 
of firm’s product lines that are self-identified as being medium quality. The omitted category is low quality.    
f.  Toddler is the proportion of firm’s product lines manufactured for toddlers. The omitted category is proportion manufactured for 
teens.  
g.  Report Year after 2000 is a dummy variable for whether an observation was reported for the years 2005, 2006 or 2007. The omitted 
category is observations reported for the year 2000. 
h.  Robust t values are in parentheses. 
i. 
** and 
* indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.  
  25 
 
Table 6 Production Function Estimates 
  1 2  3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable:  Log VA Log Output 




(-1.62) (0.48) (-0.08)  (13.26)  (13.18)  (2.72) 







(12.62) (9.27)  (3.58)  (8.34) (6.25) (1.96) 




     (14.02)  (11.79)  (17.73) 
Log K  0.21
**    0.11
**   
(5.15)     (4.40)    
Log Physical Capital   0.09
* 0.08   0.05 0.04 
 (2.02)  (1.74)    (1.65) (1.29) 





 (2.33)  (2.18)    (2.82) (2.75) 
Log Design   0.10
** 0.11
**  0.04
*  0.04 
 (2.87)  (3.02)    (1.94) (1.75) 
Report Year After 2000     0.48    4.08
**
   (0.67)    (6.38) 
After 2000* Log L     -0.07    0.26
**
   (-0.31)    (2.59) 
After 2000*Log RM         -0.38
**
       (-6.12) 
R2 0.62  0.66  0.66  0.83  0.86  0.87 
N 322  270  270  332  275  275 
 
Notes:  
a.  The dependent variables are Value Added defined as value of output less value of raw materials measured 
in 1990 yuan and Output, which is total value of output in 1990 yuan. 
b.  L is firm total employment in a given year. 
c.  RM is the total value of raw materials purchased by the firm in yuan. 
d.  Physical Capital is the sum of the firms reported investment flows and the value of the workplace in a given 
year.  The depreciation rate applied is 10% per year. 
e.  K is the sum of Physical Capital and the amount invested to achieve a trademark and ISO certification.  The 
depreciation rate applied was 10% per year. 
f.  Report Year After 2000 is a dummy variable for whether an observation was reported for the years 2005, 
2006 or 2007. The omitted category is observations reported for the year 2000. 
g.  Design Expenditure is firm’s total expenditure on design in a year in 10,000 yuan 
f.  Certification is a dummy variable for whether or not the firm has ISO certification or a registered 
trademark.  
g.  Robust t values are in parentheses. 
h. 
** and 
* indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.  
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Figures and Charts 
 
Figure 1  
Real Monthly Wages 
 
 
Note: This chart shows average reported monthly wages in each year across both surveys.  All 
values have been deflated to 1990 yuan using the GDP deflator and the implicit deflator derived 
















Annualized Growth Rate of Wages: Sample Firms Vs. Province, 1990-2000 and 1999-2007 
 
 


















Proportion of Firms Outsourcing 
 
Note: This chart shows the proportion of firms in each year reporting that they had engaged in 














Proportion of Firms with a Registered Trademark  
 
Note:  This chart shows the proportion of firms in each year reporting that they had successfully 


















Proportion of Firms with Submitted Trademark Applications 
 
Note:  This chart shows the proportion of firms in each year reporting that they had submitted an 


















Proportion of Firms with ISO Certification  
 
Note: This chart shows the proportion of firms in each year reporting that they had received ISO 















Proportion of Firms with Submitted ISO Certification Applications 
 
Note: This chart shows the proportion of firms in each year reporting that they had submitted an 















Investment in Design  
 
Note: This chart shows the average levels of investment in design between 2000 and 2007.  
Expenditures were deflated back to 1990 yuan using the GDP deflator.   















Figure 9 a 
 




Median Profit per Unit of Invested Capital Unadjusted for Implicit Entrepreneur Compensation 
 
 
Note: Profit in figure 9a is calculated as (Total Revenue – Total Cost – Compensation to the 
Entrepreneur).  We assume the entrepreneur was compensated at 1.5x the annual salary paid to the 
average worker he employed.  The values on the vertical axis have been indexed to set profit in the year 
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